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Volume 27, Number 3, 2005 of the Journal of Real Estate Research


Homeowners? Repeat-Sale Gains, Dual Agency and Repeated Use of the Same Agent

Professor Richard D. Evans
Fogelman College of Business and Economics
University of Memphis
Memphis TN 38152,
Phone: (901) 678-3632
E-mail: revans1@memphis.edu
 
Professor Phillip T. Kolbe
Fogelman College of Business and Economics
University of Memphis
Memphis TN 38152
Phone (901) 678-4090
E-mail: pkolbe@memphis.edu
 

Abstract: Previous studies of dual agency, where one agent serves both buyer and seller in a transaction, use hedonic models. Repeat-sale methods can test for the price effect of accepting dual agency. Dual agency does not show convincing effects on expected gain, which would occur if there was a systematic bias, or on heteroscedasticity, which would occur if there are large effects that are rare. Earlier researchers could not test for the effect of an owner picking a listing agent who was the earlier selling agent. Consistently positive mean abnormal price gains come from this choice, as well as significant heteroscedasticity.



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